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NOTE
WAGE WAR: ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTION
WAIVERS AT THE EXPENSE OF WAGE AND
HOUR CLAIMS
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any
disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one
arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their
claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with
their employers?"'

Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Gorsuch
presented the above question in May 2018 when the Court issued its
ruling in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. 2 In the last thirty years, the
Supreme Court has affirmed and expanded arbitration's reach, and this
ruling was no exception. In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Supreme
Court considered whether section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA")--which
guarantees
workers
"the
right
to
selforganization ... to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing" and the right "to engage in other concerted activities for

1. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1632 (holding that arbitration agreements must be "enforced as written"); Am.
Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 228-29, 238-39 (2013) (holding that the prohibitively
high cost of arbitration is an insufficient reason to overrule class action waivers); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343, 352 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") preempts state laws that prevent a party from disallowing class waivers in arbitration

agreements); Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 576-77, 592 (2008) (holding that
parties cannot contractually expand the limited scope ofjudicial review provided for in the FAA);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 105-06, 120-21 (2001) (holding that the employee
exemption provided for by the FAA applies only to the positions specifically listed in the statute);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20, 35 (1991) (holding that arbitration can be
compelled to resolve statutory claims); see Deepak Gupta & Lina Khan, Arbitration as Wealth

Transfer, 35 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 499, 505-08 (2017).
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the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection'-prohibits class and collective action waivers in
employment arbitration agreements.' The plaintiffs in Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis argued that the right to pursue claims on a class or
6
collective basis constitutes a concerted activity protected by the NLRA.
Nonetheless, an ideologically divided Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that
employers may include class and collective action waivers in arbitration
agreements with their employees.'
Arbitration is a dispute resolution method used as an alternative to
filing a lawsuit and seeking adjudication of a legal claim in court."
Employers have increasingly turned to mandatory arbitration to resolve
employment disputes, touting its purported cost-efficiency, shorter
resolution time, and the privacy of its proceedings.9 The disposition time
(or time that it takes for resolution) to arbitrate an employment law case
is much shorter than the disposition time of an employment law case
pursued through the judicial system because there are limited discovery
procedures, less motion practice, and less work required of an attorney
handling an arbitration proceeding.o While two parties may voluntarily
agree to resolve a dispute through arbitration, employers often require
their employees to submit to mandatory or "forced arbitration.""
Usually this means that an employee's job is conditional upon the
employee's consent to arbitrate some or all claims they have against the

4. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct.
at 1619.
5. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619-20.
6. Id. at 1624.
7. Id. at 1624, 1632; Employment Arbitration Agreements with Class Action Waivers Are
Enforceable: But Are They Right for Your Workforce?, BAKER MCKENZIE (May 22, 2018),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2018/05/employment-arbitration-agreemen
ts-with-class [hereinafter Employment Arbitration Agreements with Class Action Waivers Are
Enforceable].
8. Jay E. Grenig, Evolution of the Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Resolving
Employment Disputes, 71 DisP. RESOL. J. 99, 100 (2016).
9. A. Michael Weber, Employment Arbitration: A PracticalAssessment of Advantages and
Disadvantages,LITLER MENDELSON P.C. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.littler.com/publicationpress/press/employment-arbitration-practical-assessment-advantages-and-disadvantages.
10. Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer's
Quinceanera, 81 TUL. L. REv. 331, 343, 346, 353 (2006). One study indicates that the average
employment discrimination case in arbitration takes 8.6 months while the average employment
discrimination case in litigation takes nearly two years, with an average of 679.5 days. Id. at 343.
Another study comparing employment arbitration to trials found a nondiscrimination arbitration
took 250 days on average, while a nondiscrimination trial took 723 days in state court and 709 days
in federal court. Id.
11. ArbitrationAgreements, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, https://www.workplacefairness.org/force
d-arbitration-agreements (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
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employer. 2 Although employees do not legally have to agree to submit
their claims to binding arbitration, an employer does not have to hire a
person or continue to employ an employee who refuses to submit to
mandatory employment arbitration. 13
As the prevalence of arbitration in the workplace expands, so too
has the instance of wage theft or "the nonpayment of wages for work
that has already been performed." 4 Companies are violating wage laws
now more than ever before, 5 and employers can commit wage theft in a
multitude of ways: for example, by failing to pay their employees the
statutory minimum wage, or by failing to pay employees for overtime
work.' 6 Employers may also commit wage theft when they do not pay
employees for time spent traveling between job sites, for activities
performed before and after their shifts, and for preparation work that is
central to employees' work activities. 7 Even certain methods of
rounding employees' working time can constitute wage theft.18
A study of three major cities-New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles-found that two-thirds of low-income workers were subject to
at least one wage theft violation per week.'9 That same study found that
the average worker lost $2634 per year in wage theft violations and the
total loss of all workers in the three cities was almost $3 billion per

12.
13.

Id.
Id.

14.

Gupta& Khan, supra note 3, at 510; Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor

Market, 4 U.C.IRVINE L. REv. 655, 656 (2014).
15. Gupta& Khan, supra note 3, at 510; see Brady Meixell &Ross Eisenbrey, An Epidemic
of Wage Theft Is Costing Workers Hundreds of Millions of Dollars a Year, ECON. POL'Y INST.

(Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.epi.org/publication/epidemic-wage-theft-costing-workers-hundreds
(noting the rapid increase in federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") cases filed, increasing from
5302 cases in 2008 to 7764 cases in 2013).
16.

Gupta& Khan, supra note 3, at 510.

17.

Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 681, 692-93 (1946) (holding that

preliminary work activities performed by an employee subject to the control of an employer and
performed entirely for the employer's benefit constitute compensable working time under the

FLSA); Gupta & Khan, supra note 3, at 510. The 1947 Portal to Portal Act abrogated the Supreme
Court's Mt. Clemens Pottery decision by, inter alia, narrowly defining compensable time and
deeming employee travel time to and from work non-compensable. Portal to Portal Act of 1947, 29

U.S.C. § 254 (2012). The Act also limited employees' rights by instituting a two-year statute of
limitations for which to bring back-wage claims-except for willful violations, which may be
commenced within three years. Id.

§

255.

18. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, How Employers Profit from Digital Wage Theft Under the
FLSA, 55 AM. Bus. L.J. 315, 337-41 (2018). Common employment practices such as rounding
employee time, instituting automatic break deductions, and shaving time off of employee timesheets
can all constitute wage theft Id. For further discussion of illegal deductions, see generally id. at

338-73.
19.

Meixell & Eisenbrey, supra note 15.
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year. 2 0 When these numbers are extrapolated to a national scale, the total
loss to all workers in America is more than $50 billion per year,
demonstrating the enormous cumulative effect even small acts of wage
theft can have.2 1
Class and collective actions allow individuals to pursue claims that
would not ordinarily be economically viable on their own because of
their small value. 2 2 Further, class and collective actions make small
claims more appealing to attorneys.2 3 Without such mechanisms, many
employees are left without a remedy or a means of redress to pursue
their claim. 2 4 Low wage earners, such as day laborers, are particularly
vulnerable to the effects of wage theft because they make "relatively low
wages," and attorneys will often only take wage theft cases on a
contingency basis. 2 5 However, employers fear having to litigate claims
on a class or collective basis because of the financial consequences and
pressure to settle the claims.2 6 Owing to the Supreme Court's decision to
approve class waivers in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, some of the most
well-known law firms in the country have recommended that employers

20.
21.

Id.
Id.

22.

Myriam Gilles, The Politics ofAccess: Examining Concerted State/Private Enforcement

Solutions to Class Action Bans, 86 FORDHAM L. REv. 2223, 2227, 2228 (2018) ("[M]illions of
ordinary citizens [have been left] without remedy for violations of statutory and common law rights

resulting in small per-plaintiff harm.").
23. Id. at 2227 ("Aggregating claims rendered them marketable and aroused lawyers to invest
time and money to litigate complex issues on behalf of a class of victims. The net result was greater
deterrence and compensation, as well as more extensive law enforcement.").

24. Id. at 2228.
25. Lee, supra note 14, at 661-62; see Gilles, supra note 22, at 2228 (arguing that states are
responsible for protecting low-income groups from abuse that stems from the underenforcement of
state consumer and labor laws). Day laborers, who are often undocumented immigrants, are
particularly at risk because of their immigration status. Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A
Survey of the Last Thirty Years of Wage Litigation and Its Impact on Low-Wage Workers, 30

HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355, 370-71 (2013). Many day laborers do not file wage theft
complaints either because they do not know that they can, or because they are afraid of being

deported for such complaints. Id.
26.

See Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.

1631, 1638 (2005) (stating that "businesses jumped on the opportunity to compel arbitration in
contexts where they previously thought arbitration agreements would not be enforced" because they

feared many aspects of litigation, including class actions).
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at least consider adding class waivers to their employment agreements to
avoid such an outcome.2 7
Although Justice Gorsuch presented the issue of class and
collective waiver enforcement rather simplistically, the decision to
expand federal policy favoring arbitration by upholding such bans in
arbitration agreements has and will tremendously impact the ways and
extent in which workers can pursue claims against their employers.2 8
Ultimately, this Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis incorrectly resolved the conflict between the
NLRA and the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") and, as a result, the
decision will have public policy consequences leading to the
underenforcement of wage and hour laws and preventing employees
from effectively bringing their claims.2 9 It is true that many
employment-related claims, such as discrimination claims, are
individualized claims; however, this Note focuses narrowly on wage and
hour claims which often do not require individual litigation and are
usually only economically feasible to bring on a class-wide basis.3 0
Part II of this Note distinguishes between class and collective
actions in the United States and uses empirical studies to demonstrate
the extent to which class and collective actions are used. 3 1 Part II also
introduces the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the FAA, and it
summarizes key Supreme Court decisions that track the expansion of
arbitration in the United States. 3 2 Part III of this Note discusses both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis; it then

27.

Noah A. Finkel et al., A Class Waiver Can Be a Condition ofEmployment, SEYFARTH

SHAW LLP (May 21, 2018), https://www.seyfarth.com/publications/MA052118-LE

("Employers

that maintain arbitration programs without a class waiver should strongly consider revising their
agreement to include a class waiver."); Employment Arbitration Agreements with Class Action
Waivers Are Enforceable, supra note 7 (calling the Supreme Court's decision a "clear win for
employers seeking to avoid the expense and disruption of class litigation" and recommending that
employers that have arbitration agreements without class waivers "consider" their inclusion); see
Ron Chapman, Jr. & Christopher C. Murray, Supreme CourtIssues Pro-Employer Ruling on Class
Action Waiver Issue, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. (May 21, 2018),
https://ogletree.com/shared-content/content/blog/2018/may/supreme-court-issues-pro-employer-

ruling-on-class-action-waiver-issue

(announcing the firm's launch of a new tool called DIY

Arbitration Agreements intended to "help employers quickly and conveniently generate arbitration
agreements with class action waivers" given the Supreme Court's decision).

28.

See infra Part III.C.

29.
30.
31.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part II; supra PartI.
See infra Part II.B.

32.

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.

§§1-16

(2012); see infra Parts II.C-D.
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argues that the Epic decision disregards other Supreme Court precedent
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP" or "Rule").3 3 Finally,
Part III discusses the effects of the majority's holding, including the
underenforcement of wage and hour laws and the increasing challenges
34
employees now face in bringing wage and hour claims. Part IV of this
Note recognizes past congressional efforts to correct arbitration injustice
and proposes amendments to the FAA that would remedy the
information deficit employees face in the context of employment
arbitration, and Part V summarizes the problems and solutions
addressed throughout.35
II. THE FEDERAL STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL SCHE1VIES
REGULATING ARBITRATION, WAGES, AND CLASS LITIGATION

This Part introduces the FLSA, the statute through which many
employees pursue claims of wage theft in federal court and its statutory
scheme for enforcement. 3 6 Next, this Part explores the procedural
devices that enable employees to pursue claims collectively and explains
why these methods are often the only viable ways in which to pursue a
wage theft claim. 3 7 The FAA is the vehicle by which employers have
been empowered to deny employees their class and collective rights in
favor of individual arbitration, so this Part next introduces the FAA and
its legislative history and purpose, demonstrating that the original
purpose of arbitration has strayed significantly from what it once was.
Finally, this Part summarizes the key Supreme Court cases that are the
backbone for the legal expansion of arbitration in the employment
context and which were precursors and precedent for the Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis decision.3 9
A.

Protectionfrom Wage Theft: The FLSA

In 1937, United States Senator Hugo Black of Alabama and United
States Representative William P. Connery Jr. of Massachusetts
introduced almost identical bills to the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, to provide workers with an eight-hour

33.
34.

See infra Part III.
See infra Parts II.A-C.

35.

See infra Parts V, IV.

36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See infra Part IB.
38. See infra Part I.C.
39. See infra Part I.D.
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40.

John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW

&

workday and a forty-hour workweek. 4 0 Their bills ultimately became the
FLSA, and it was passed in 1938 after more than a year of modification
and countless amendments. 4 1 President Franklin D. Roosevelt viewed
the FLSA as one of the most important pieces of legislation to be
contemplated since the Social Security Act of 1935.42 Only three years
after its passage, the FLSA provided protection for at least 700,000
employees in the United States by securing them a minimum wage of
twenty-five cents per hour. 4 3 One of the express purposes of the FLSA
was to remedy "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers."" Although the FLSA has undergone
considerable change since its inception,4 5 today it guarantees employees
compensation at a rate equal to the federal minimum wage for each hour
of work and overtime compensation at 1.5 times the employee's regular
rate of pay for all hours worked over forty in a workweek.4 6
The FLSA may be enforced by employees who bring private
actions against their employer47 or by the Secretary of Labor, who is
authorized to bring an FLSA action on behalf of an employee and to
supervise the payment of an employee. 4 Generally, courts will reject

CONTEMP. PROBS., 464, 465-66, 481 (1939).
41. Id. at 466. The journey to enacting the FLSA was filled with significant challenges and
the amendments to the proposed legislation were so extensive that "the only point in common with

the original bill was the legislative number." Id.
42. Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage. The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 123 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 32, 32 (2000). Several groups were opposed to labor
reform including the business community, Republicans, and Southern Democrats. Id. During one of

his fireside chats, President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed such opposition, including the FLSA's
twenty-five cent per hour minimum wage provision, and instructed the American people not to "let

any calamity-howling executive with an income of$1,000 a day .. .tell you that a wage of $11.00 a
week is going to have a disastrous effect on all American industry." Teresa Tritch, F.D.R. Makes the
Case for the Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Mar. 7, 2014, 10:56 AM),
https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/f-d-r-makes-the-case-for-the-minimum-wage.
43. Samuel, supra note 42, at 37.

44. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012).
45. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, ch. 736, 63
Stat. 910.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-07 (2012). Note, however, that the FLSA does not cover all employees
in the United States-only those who are "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or [who are] employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce." Id. § 206(a). The FLSA also exempts executive, administrative, and

professionals from coverage. Id. § 213(a)(1) (2012). Additionally, many employees who work in
amusement or recreational establishments, in agriculture, and in fishing operations are not covered.

Id.

§

213(a)(3)-(6). For a discussion of misclassified and exempt workers under the FLSA, see

Ruan, supra note 26, at 361-62.

47. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
48. Id. § 216(c). Initially, an employee could only enforce the FLSA by instituting a private
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private FLSA settlements that have not been either approved by a court
or overseen by the Department of Labor ("DOL"). 49 Further, its
provisions may not be negotiated or waived by an employee.so
In addition to creating both a private and public right of action,
Congress also included liquidated damage penalties in the FLSA that
allow an employee to recover the amount of their underpayment plus an
amount equal to that underpayment to deter employers from violating
the FLSA. 5 1 In other words, employees who succeed on wage theft
claims may receive double the damages.5 2 The FLSA also encourages
employers to abide by its standards by mandating that any employer
subject to its provisions must "make, keep, and preserve" time and wage
records for each employee.5 3
Currently, the federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour.5 4 Although
the federal government has instituted a wage minimum, the federal
minimum wage is only considered a "floor," meaning that states can
55
enact minimum wage rates that are higher than $7.25 per hour. More
56
than half of the states and the District of Columbia have doneso.
Sixteen states have state minimum wages that are equal to the federal
57
minimum wage, and another five states have no state minimum wage.
Eighteen states are scheduled to adjust their state minimum wages, each
action; however, the FLSA was later amended to include public enforcement provisions. Fair Labor

Standards Amendments of 1949 § 14.
49. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. U.S., 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982).
Other than a section 216(c) payment supervised by the Department of Labor, there is
only one context in which compromises of FLSA back wage or liquidated damage
claims may be allowed: a stipulated judgment entered by a court which has determined
that a settlement proposed by an employer and employees, in a suit brought by the
employees under the FLSA, is a fair and reasonable resulution [sic] of a bona fide
dispute over FLSA provisions.

Id. But see Martin v. Spring Break '83 Prods., L.L.C., 688 F.3d 247, 254-57 (5th Cir. 2012)
(approving a private FLSA settlement where both sides had counsel who negotiated at arms'
length). Three years after Martin was decided, the Fifth Circuit declined to extend approval of
private settlements, limiting the validity of private settlements to those "reached due to a bona fide
FLSA dispute over hours worked or compensation owed." Bodle v. TXL Mortg. Corp., 788 F.3d

159, 161, 165 (5th Cir. 2015).
50. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1945). For example, the Court
stated that an employee should not be able to "waive his right to liquidated damages." Id. at 706.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 211(c). Although the FLSA requires employers to keep accurate time records, there
is no private right of action for claims related to recordkeeping. Tippett, supra note 18, at 334.

54. 29 U.S.C.

§

206(a)(1)(C).

55. Noah A. Finkel, State Wage-and-Hour Law Class Actions: The Real Wave of "FLSA"
Litigation?,7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 159, 166 (2003).
56. Consolidated Minimum Wage Table, U.S. DEP'T. OF LAB. (July 1, 2019),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/mw-consolidated.htm.

57. Id.
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with varying schedules based on their own formulas." Where federal
minimum wage is greater than state minimum wage, the federal
minimum wage prevails; however, where state minimum wage is greater
than federal minimum wage, the state minimum wage applies.5 9
In addition, many states have endeavored to protect employees in
the workplace by enacting statutes that provide a right of private
enforcement, giving employees the right to bring an action on their own
behalf and by class and collective litigation.6 0 Very few employees who
are victims of wage theft are likely to pursue their claims individually
because of the relatively small awards available compared to the cost of
litigation. 6 An even smaller number of employees pursue their claims
individually through arbitration because of this same economic
cost inefficiency.62
B.

Collective Actions Versus Class Actions

The FLSA requires that "multi-plaintiff' actions alleging violations
of the FLSA be brought by collective action wherein "an individual must
affirmatively opt-in to join the suit." 6 3 Other wage claims, such as
violations of state wage and hour laws, do not have to be brought on an
opt-in basis.i Instead, such claims may be brought on an opt-out basis in
accordance with FRCP 23.65
One or more plaintiffs who seek to represent parties in a Rule 23
class action can only do so by demonstrating numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy. 6 6 To satisfy numerosity, the class must be "so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." 67 To achieve
commonality, there must be "questions of law or fact common to the

58.
59.

Id.
Id.

60. Gilles, supra note 22, at 2224 ("Many of these state consumer and labor statutes expressly
anticipate class and collective litigation as a principal means ofprivate enforcement.").

61. Id. at 2224-25; Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the
Past Quarter Century, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 427 (2010) (arguing that class action
waivers are intended to "discourage the pursuit of relatively small claims," including consumer
claims and wage claims).
62. Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 691,
695(2018).
63. Finkel, supra note 55, at 166. The FLSA provides: "No employee shall be a party plaintiff
to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is

filed in the court in which such action is brought." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
64. Finkel, supra note 55, at 166.
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (stating that after notice of class certification is sent to all
class members, "the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion").

66. Id. 23(a).
67. Id. 23(a)(1).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

492

[Vol. 48:483

class."6 8 Typicality requires that "the claims or defenses of the
representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class,"
and adequacy requires that "the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." 69
Class action representatives are also required to prove that the class
action they seek to bring meets one of the criteria set forth under Rule
23(b). 7 0 According to Noah A. Finkel, an attorney and partner at
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Rule 23(b)(3) is the usual route for plaintiffs, who
can obtain certification of their class if"the court finds that questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy."7 1
Although the precise number of wage theft instances in the United
States is unknown, estimates of the total amount of money recovered by
7 2
wage theft victims can offer one measurement of its prevalence. Brady
Meixell and Ross Eisenbrey of the Economic Policy Institute estimate
that nearly one billion dollars was recovered by wage theft victims in
2012 alone. 7 3 Meixell and Eisenbrey calculated this figure by adding
together the total money recovered on behalf of employees by the United
States DOL ($280 million), by state departments of labor in forty-four
states ($172 million), by state attorneys general in forty-five states ($14
million), and by private attorneys in wage and hour lawsuits via class
action litigation ($467 million).7 4 These figures total approximately $933
million in wage theft loss for a single year-a number that Meixell and
Meixell and
Eisenbrey say "is only the tip of the wage-theft iceberg."
Eisenbrey believe that wage theft is even more prevalent than these
numbers suggest based on their assertion that most victims of wage theft
never bring a suit or alert the government, and based on the fact that
there is insufficient wage theft recovery data for six state departments
and five attorneys general.7 6

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. 23(a)(2).
Id. 23(a)(3),23(a)(4).
Id. 23(b).
Finkel, supra note 55, at 167-68 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). Finkel served as co-

counsel for Epic Systems Corporation in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612
(2018); Noah A. Finkel, SEYFARTH SHAW, https://www.seyfarth.com/people/noah-a-finkel.html

(last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
72. Meixell & Eisenbrey, supra note 15.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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There is a large amount of data on federal securities class actions
because for-profit organizations maintain such empirical data; however,
no such database exists for non-securities class actions.7 7 Professor Brian
Fitzpatrick conducted a study of all the class action settlements approved
by federal district court judges between 2006 and 2007 and concluded
that there were 688 settlements during those years-304 of which were
approved in 2006 and 384 of which were approved in 2007.' Prior to
Fitzpatrick's study, the largest studies of class action settlements outside
of the securities realm had identified only 689 class actions during a
sixteen-year period. 7 9 Fitzpatrick's study dispelled the notion that
securities class actions "dominate" federal class action cases.80
Comprising forty percent and thirty-five percent of class actions in 2006
and 2007, respectively, securities class actions had the largest number of
settlements by subject matter; however, labor and employment class
actions were the next largest subject matter of class actions, at fourteen
percent of settlements in both 2006 and 2007.
C.

The FederalArbitrationAct: EnforcingArbitration

Arbitration has ancient roots in settling disputes; for example,
arbitration was used to fashion a peace treaty between Greek city-states,
to settle commercial disputes in ancient Rome, and to enforce contracts
and "guild norms" of merchant and trade guilds during the Middle
Ages. 8 2 Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to ensure that arbitration
agreements were enforced in the same manner as other contracts." Prior
to its enactment, common law courts regularly declined to enforce
agreements to arbitrate, and there was "a perception that courts were

77.

Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee

Award, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 814-15 (2010). Professor Fitzpatrick is a law professor at
Vanderbilt University, who conducts research on class action litigation and federal courts, among
other areas of law. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, VAND. L. SCH., https://law.vanderbilt.edu/bio/brian-

fitzpatrick (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
78. Id. at 816-17.
79. Id. at 815. Another large study of class action settlements involved an analysis of attorney
fees and proposed recommendations in order to advise the court on the reasonableness of such fees.
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Actions Settlements: An

EmpiricalStudy, 1 J. EMPRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 27 (2004).
80. Fitzpatrick, supra note 77, at 818. According to John C. Coffee, securities class actions
are "the 800-pound gorilla that dominates and overshadows other forms of class actions." John C.
Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on DeterrenceandIts Implementation,

106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1539 (2006).
81. Fitzpatrick, supra note 77, at 818.
82. Grenig, supra note 8, at 102-03.
83. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
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unduly hostile to arbitration." 84 As a result, any party could avoid an
agreement to arbitrate by refusing to proceed, as American courts
perceived such agreements as revocable and unenforceable." Even if
two parties did proceed with arbitration as agreed upon, the successful
party might face an uphill battle to recover a judgment in his favor if, for
example, the other party cited fraud, misconduct, or another procedural
defect in the arbitration proceedings.8 6
Congress also felt the FAA was necessary because of several
problems then facing the American court system. 87 These problems
included a backlog of litigation in courts caused by frequent motions and
appeals made by litigants, the high cost of litigation, and the inability of
traditional litigation procedures to justly rule in accordance with "the
standards of the business world." 8 8 Motivated by these concerns, the
business community supported a movement towards arbitration and
away from traditional litigation, given the need to expeditiously settle
commercial disputes. 8 9 Other organizations, including the American Bar
Association, also supported resolution of disputes through arbitration.9 0
However, the purpose of arbitration in the twentieth century (when the
FAA was passed) was to resolve commercial and maritime disputesnot employment contract disputes. 9 1 In fact, the FAA specifically
excepts the employment contracts of seamen, railroad employees, and
any other workers engaged in commerce from applicability. 92
The Supreme Court has addressed issues related to arbitration
several times in the last three decades-particularly addressing issues
related to arbitration in the employment context.9 3 Each time, the Court
84.

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018).

85.

Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.

REv. 265, 270 (1926).
86. Id. at 270-71.
87. Id at 269.
88. Id
89. Id at 265.
90. Id at 265 & n.2.
91. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (mandating the validity, irrevocability, and enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate maritime transactions and transactions involving commerce); see also id § 1
(defining the terms "maritime transactions" and "commerce").

92. Id. The FAA provides: "[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." Id.

93.

See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (addressing the role of

arbitration as related to employees' right to concerted action under the NLRA); Am. Express Co. v.

It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233-34 (2013) (addressing the validity of arbitration clauses
prohibiting class action litigation in the antitrust context); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333, 336 (2011) (addressing "whether the FAA prohibits States from conditioning the
enforceability

of certain arbitration agreements

on the availability of class-wide arbitration

procedures"); Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008) (addressing whether the
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has strengthened and expanded the reach of arbitration, following the
view that federal policy favors arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism. 94 Now employees and employers know that claims under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") are
enforceable, that the FAA's exclusion provisions exclude only the
employment contracts of transportation workers, that parties to an
arbitration contract cannot expand the limited scope of judicial review
the FAA provides, that the FAA preempts state laws that attempt to
prevent contracts from containing class-wide arbitration, and that class
action bans are enforceable. 95
D.

Case Law: A FederalPolicy FavoringArbitration

Beginning in the 1980s and prior to the Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.9 6 decision, employers began to face an
increasing number of lawsuits filed by their employees as a result of
their employment-at-will. 9 7 According to Professor Theodore J. St.
Antoine, employers had to defend against "[t]hree principal legal
theories": (1) tort claims arising from discharges, (2) contract claims
"based on oral commitments to an employee at the time of hiring or
statements of policy in personnel manuals," and (3) wrongful discharge
claims "based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."9 8
After the Gilmer decision was issued, employers no longer had to face
such claims in court if they strategically inserted an arbitration provision
in their employment contracts or made arbitration a condition of
grounds for vacatur and modification of an arbitration award under the FAA may be supplemented

by the contracting parties); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (addressing
the applicability of the FAA to the employment contracts of employees outside the section 1

exemption); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (addressing whether a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 "can be subjected to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application").

94. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hasp., 460 U.S. at 24 ("Section 2 (of the
FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary."); Rodriguez de Quijas

v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (rejecting the view that arbitration weakens
the substantive protections of the law, a view which "has fallen far out of step with our current
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring [the use of arbitration to] resolv[e] disputes").

95. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1632; It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. at 228; Concepcion, 563
U.S. at 336, 352; Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 578; Adams, 532 U.S. at 109; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
96. 500U.S.20(1991).
97. See St. Antoine, supra note 61, at 412. Professor St. Antoine is a law professor at the
University of Michigan Law School, where he specializes in teaching labor and employment and
contract law. St. Antoine, Theodore J, U. MICH., https://www.law.umich.edu/FacultyBioPages/Fac

ultyBio.aspx?FaclD=tstanton (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
98. Id. at 412-13.
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many employers began requiring
employment. 99 Accordingly,
employees to waive all rights to bring any action in court, even if the
claims were statutory. 0 0
The Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp."o'
has been called "the most significant and most debated
[alternative dispute resolution] decision in labor and employment law
ruling the past quarter century."' 02 In Gilmer, the Court announced that
103
claims under the ADEA could be subject to mandatory arbitration.
Petitioner Robert Gilmer ("Gilmer") was sixty-two years old when he
was terminated from his position as Manager of Financial Services.'0 4
Subsequently, Gilmer filed an age discrimination claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and brought suit against
Interstate, claiming he was terminated because of his age. 0 5 Interstate
responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration.10 6 As a securities
representative, Gilmer had registered with stock exchanges, and in his
registration application, he agreed to submit any dispute with Interstate
to arbitration.' 0 7
The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration based on
the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.o's
and held that "Congress intended to protect ADEA claimants from the
waiver of a judicial forum."1 09 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that a party who agrees to arbitrate should be bound to that agreement
unless Congress intended to preclude waiver of a judicial remedy."o
Gilmer challenged the adequacy of arbitration to resolve disputes,
highlighting the partiality of arbitrators, the limited nature of discovery
procedures, and the inequality of bargaining power, but the majority of
the Court summarily rejected each of these arguments."'
Another significant decision came seventeen years later when the
Supreme Court decided Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel.112 Although the

99.
100.
101.

Id. at 414.
Id
500 U.S. 20 (1991).

102.

St. Antoine, supra note 61, at 411.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23-24.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
Id at 26.

111. Id. at 30-33 ("[W~e note that in our recent arbitration cases we have already rejected most
of these arguments as insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims."). Id. at 30.

112.

552U.S.576(2008).
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FAA provides very limited means for judicial review of arbitration
awards, 13 the parties in that case agreed to contractually expand the
bounds of judicial review.1 14 The parties decided that a court could
override an arbitrator's decision if the "conclusions of law are
erroneous."' " After hearing the case, the Supreme Court held that courts
may not expand the limited scope of judicial review that the FAA
provides for arbitration awards, even if the terms were agreed upon by
the parties.' 16
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,"7 the Court further
expanded the reach of arbitration in a decision that will continue to have
a significant impact on class and collective claims in the future." There,
the Court held that the FAA preempts state laws that interfere with
arbitration procedures.' 1 9The plaintiffs, Vincent and Liza Concepcion,
filed a complaint against AT&T Mobility LLC ("AT&T") in the
Southern District of California after being charged sales tax for
purchasing phones that were advertised by the company as free. 12 0 The
Concepcions' claims were joined with a putative class action against
AT&T for false advertising and fraud, and AT&T moved to compel
arbitration of the claim. 12 1 The Concepcions' contract with AT&T
contained an arbitration agreement requiring their claims be brought on
an individual basis "and not as a plaintiff or class member in any
purported class or representative proceeding." 12 2
Although the FAA requires an arbitration agreement to be enforced
by its terms, its "saving clause" provides that an arbitration agreement
can be deemed unenforceable "upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 2 3 Accordingly, the
113. See 9 U.S.C.

§§

10-11 (2012). The FAA allows a United States court to vacate an

arbitration award where such an award "was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means[,]
where there was evident partiality or corruption" by the arbitrators, "where the arbitrators were

guilty of misconduct," and "where the arbitrators exceeded their powers." Id. §10(a)(l)-(4).
114. Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 579.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 584, 592 (holding that "§§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA's exclusive
grounds for expedited vacatur and modification").

117.

563U.S.333(2011).

118.

See Adam

Liptak, Supreme Court Allows

Contracts That Prohibit Class-Action

Arbitration,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, atB3, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/28biz
court.html (quoting Brian T. Fitzpatrick, who characterized the Concepcion decision as one that

"basically lets companies escape class actions, so long as they do so by means of arbitration
agreements").
119. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
120. Id. at 336-37.
121. Id. at 337.
122.

Id. at 336 (quoting the arbitration agreement at issue).

123.

9 U.S.C.

§

2 (2012).
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Concepcions claimed the ban on class procedures made the agreement
"unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory." 2 4 Such an argument was
based on the California Supreme Court's decision in Discover Bank v.
SuperiorCourt, wherein the court held that:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a
setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably
involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the
party with superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually
small sums of money ... the waiver becomes in practice the
exemption of the party "from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or
willful injury to the person or property of another." Under these
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law
and should not be enforced. 125
Despite the Concepcions' argument, the Supreme Court upheld the
arbitration agreement, reasoning that the FAA preempts state law and
deciding that "[a]lthough § 2's saving clause preserves generally
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
FAA's objectives." 126 Given that the FAA was intended to promote
faster resolution of disputes and to ensure judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements between parties, the Court held that the Discovery
Bank v. Superior Court rule "interferes with arbitration" and is
"inconsistent with the FAA." 1 2 7 Such a decision played a tremendous
role in the Supreme Court's next decision to address class waivers and
arbitration, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. 12 8
III.

CONFLICTING COMMANDS: THE FLSA AND THE FAA

This Part first explores the legal arguments made in Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis. 12 9 Next, this Part argues that the Epic decision is in direct
contravention with another line of Supreme Court cases that stands for
promoting judicial supervision of all FLSA wage and hour settlements to

124. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337.
125. Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (quoting CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1668 (West 2011)).
126. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343.
127. Id. at 346, 348. According to the Court, class procedures are inconsistent with the FAA
because, among other factors, there are absent parties, confidentiality is jeopardized, and class
claims require more procedural formality. Id. at 348.
128. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622-23 (2018).
129. See infra Part M.A.
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preserve the congressional protections bestowed by the FLSA.1 3 0
Finally, this Part discusses the public policy arguments that support a
conclusion that class and collective action waivers should be
unenforceable in the wage and hour context, especially because of the
detrimental effect class and collective action waivers have on wage theft
prevention. 1 3 1 This discussion is proceeded by statistics concerning the
number of employees in the United States who will be affected by the
Epic decision and the number of claims that will simply be abandoned
because employees will be unable to find counsel to take their claims on
an individual basis, or because it will cease to be economically viable to
pursue their claims. 1 32
Throughout the last three decades, the Supreme Court has
systematically expanded the reach of arbitration and whittled away the
rights of individuals in arbitration, but the largest blow came in 2018
when, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Court decided that class and
collective waivers in mandatory arbitration
agreements are
enforceable. 13 3 Myriam Gilles characterizes class waivers in mandatory
arbitration clauses as "the most consequential impediment" that ordinary
people face in accessing the "civil justice system." 3 4 Indeed, employees
already face an uphill battle to attain the wages statutorily owed to them
in the confines of a system that does not punish non-compliant
employers with punitive damages.1 3 5 This gives employers the incentive
to cheat their employees and "wait for enforcement" of wage and hour
laws-if enforcement ever comes at all.1 3 6 Employer compliance levels
with the FLSA are "closely related to employer characteristics that make
detection difficult, including .. . a workforce with little incentive to
contact enforcers due to immigration status or lack of other
employment options."l 37

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See infra Part IIB.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part I.C.L
Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1632; see supra Part I.D.
Gilles, supra note 22, at 2223.

135. Nantiya Ruan, What's Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates That Bar
Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1103, 1111-12 (arguing that
employers do a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether or not to comply with the FLSA-a
calculus that "informs employers to keep their money in the bank and wait for enforcement").

&

136. Id at II11.
137. Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liabilityfor Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP.
LAB. L. 1, 19 (2010).
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Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis: An Epic Failureby the Supreme
Court

The decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis was a consolidation of
three cases wherein the plaintiff-employee in each case signed an
individual arbitration agreement with their employer that required them
to resolve any and all employment disputes through arbitration, rather
138
than in a judicial proceeding as a class or collective action.
Subsequently, each plaintiff sought to bring a class action for their
respective states claims and a collective action for their respective FLSA
claims, instead of submitting to individual arbitration.1 39 Justice
Gorsuch's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
40
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.1
The legal issue presented to the Court required analysis of the
interplay between the FAA and the NLRA; specifically, whether the
NLRA offers a "conflicting command" to the FAA.141 While the FAA
was meant to ensure arbitration agreements are enforced, section 7 of the
42
NLRA guarantees workers the right to engage in concerted action.1
Accordingly, each plaintiff sought to pursue their claims on class and
collective bases because the FAA contains a "saving clause" that
nullifies a party's obligation to arbitrate a claim under an arbitration
agreement if it violates another federal law.1 4 3 Beginning in 2012, the
National Labor Relations Board ruled that the NLRA nullifies the FAA
in the instance of individual arbitration agreements with class waivers.'"
Thus, the employees argued that the NLRA renders class and collective
action waivers illegal, resulting in unenforceable arbitration agreements
"upon such grounds as exist at law .. . for the revocation of
45
any contract."
The majority of the Court rejected this argument claiming that the
language of the saving clause creates refuge only for defenses that apply

138. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
139. Id. at 1620.
140. Id. at 1619. Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion in full, but also authored a short
concurring opinion wherein he argued that illegality is a public policy defense and not a ground at
law or in equity that would make class waivers in arbitration agreements a ground for revocation

under the FAA's saving clause. Id. at 1632-33.
141. Id. at 1619.
142. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.§ 2 (2012); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29
U.S.C. § 157(2012).
143. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619-20.
144. Id. at 1620; see also Supreme CourtIssues Decision in NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, NLRB
(May 21, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/supreme-court-issues-decisionnlrb-v-murphy-oil-usa.

145.

9 U.S.C.

§

2.
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to any contract, not just those that "target arbitration either by name or
by more subtle methods, such as 'interfer[ing] with fundamental
attributes of arbitration."'l46 Such an argument is based on the Court's
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.14 7 There, the Court held
that the purported unconscionability of class waivers in consumer
contracts does not qualify for refuge under the saving clause because it
would interfere with the "traditionally individualized and informal
nature of arbitration," which is a fundamental attribute of the process. 148
The plaintiffs also argued that the NLRA should "displace" the
FAA, but the majority of the Court rejected this argument, too. 14 9 In
assessing whether or not a conflict exists between the FAA and the
NLRA, the Court explained that it must try to "give effect to both
[statutes]" and that a party that seeks to override one statute with another
has a significant burden of proof to show there was a congressional
intention for that outcome. 1 o The plaintiffs attempted to meet that
burden by citing section 7 of the NLRA, which guarantees employees
"the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.""' The Court
rejected this contention, citing a lack of express disapproval of
individual arbitration and explaining that the "general" phrase "other
mutual aid or protection" does not include class and collective action
procedures because the phrase follows a list of more specific terms that
are unrelated to class and collective actions. 1 52 As further evidence to
support its ruling that the FAA preempts the NLRA, Justice Gorsuch
noted that the FAA and NLRA "have long coexisted" since the early
twentieth century.1 5 3
146. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1622 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333, 344 (2011)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1623. Previously, the Court rejected a state law defense prohibiting unconscionable
class action waivers. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341. While such a defense applies to litigation and
arbitration, the Court determined that allowing the defense would fundamentally change arbitration,
"sacrificing" its informality and "mak[ing] the process slower, more costly, and more likely to
generate procedural morass than final judgment." Id. at 347-48.

149. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1624.
150. Id at 1616 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
152. Id; Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1625 (citing the ejusdem generis canon to find that class
and collective actions outside the scope of the phrase "other mutual aid or protection").

153.

Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1620. Although this Note focuses on Epic Systems Corp. v.

Lewis, it is also worth noting that in 2019, only one year after the Epic decision, the Supreme Court
decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, yet another employment arbitration case, holding that class
arbitration may only be invoked by an employee when it is expressly provided for in the arbitration
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Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion-joined by Justices
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan-that countered the majority's argument
4
with respect to the phrase "other mutual aid or protection."1 Justice
Ginsburg argued that "[fjor decades, federal courts have endorsed the
[National Labor Relations Board's] view, comprehending that 'the filing
of a labor related civil action by a group of employees is ordinarily a
concerted activity protected by§ 7.'155 While the majority read the

NLRA narrowly in accordance with the ejusdem generis canon, the
dissent characterized the statute as one that "speaks more
embracively." 5 6Justice Ginsburg argued that the phrase "other mutual
aid or protection" creates additionalrights for employees outside of the
rights enumerated in section 7, including the right to bring a collective
lawsuit to enforce workplace rights. 15 7 Relying on the history of the
NLRA's enactment, Justice Ginsburg argued that "there is no sound
reason to employ the ejusdem generis canon to narrow § 7's protections
8
in the manner the [majority opinion] suggests." 1 Finally, the dissent
summarized the original congressional intent for the FAA, arguing that
the FAA was never intended to apply to employment contracts, stating:
"Congress never endorsed a policy favoring arbitration where one party
sets the terms of an agreement while the other is left to 'take it or
leave it."',159
B.

Epic DisregardforOther Supreme CourtDecisions

One of the primary problems with the Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
decision is that it disregards FRCP 41 and another line of Supreme Court
cases that have interpreted a congressional intent to protect workers from
wage theft and require approval by a court or the DOL for certain FLSA
claims. 16 0 Rule 41 provides methods by which an action can be
&

agreement. John D. Geelan et al., Supreme Court FurtherLimits Class Arbitration, ARNOLD
4
PORTER (May 2, 2019), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2019/0 /suprem
for
be
necessary
longer
may
no
"it
that
firm
advises
e-court-further-limits-class-arbitration. One law
companies to include class action waivers in their agreements" because of the decision. Id.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1633-49.
Id. at 1638.
Id. at 1636.
Id. at 1636-37.
Id. at 1638.
Id. at 1643. When the FAA was introduced, "organized labor voiced concern." Id. In

responses to such concern, President Herbert Hoover suggested the addition of language exempting
contracts of employment. Id. Hoover's suggested language was adopted "virtually verbatim in § 1

of the [FAA]." Id.
160. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (examining
several Supreme Court cases and concluding that "in light of the unique policy considerations

underlying the FLSA..

.

. stipulated dismissals settling FLSA claims with prejudice require the
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dismissed, both voluntarily and involuntarily.1 61 Generally, a plaintiff
may voluntarily dismiss an action without a court order by either: (1)
filing a notice of dismissal before the defendant serves an answer or
motion for summary judgment, or (2) stipulating to dismiss the action in
an agreement signed by all appearing parties.1 6 2
However, in certain instances, a plaintiff is expressly prohibited
from dismissing his case voluntarily without a court order. 16 3 For
example, a plaintiff pursuing a class action cannot settle the lawsuit
without a'court order. 16 4 FRCP 23, the federal rule that sets forth class
action procedures, specifically states that "[t]he claims, issues, or
defenses of a certified class-ora class proposed to be certified for
purposes of settlement-may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
compromised only with the court's approval." 6 5As a result, a plaintiff
pursuing a class action cannot voluntarily dismiss his case without
necessary approval. 1 6 6Thisis particularly important to the issue at hand
because many wage theft claims are brought via class action. 16 7
Additionally, FRCP 41 prevents a plaintiff from voluntarily
dismissing a suit without a court order when that suit is subject to an
"applicable federal statute."1 6 8 According to Cheeks v. FreeportPancake
House, Inc., the FLSA is one of the applicable federal statutes that
prevents a plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing a suit without a court
order in accordance with FRCP 41.169 Accordingly, there is some
precedent that FLSA claims cannot be dismissed without a court order or
DOL approval, and this should preclude class waivers. 170

approval of the district court or DOL to take effect"); see D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108,
114 (1946) ("[W]e think the remedy of liquidated damages cannot be bargained away by bona fide
settlements of disputes over coverage."); Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)
("Where a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a
right so charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed where it would thwart the

legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate.").
161. FED.R.CIv.P.41.
162.

Id. 41(a)(i)-ii).

163. Id 41(a)(1)(A) (stating that a plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order
"[s]ubject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), [and] 23.2").
164. Id.
165. Id. 23(e).
166. See id. 23(e); 41(a)(1)(A).
167.

See supra Part I.B.

168.
169.

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A).
796 F.3d 199, 200 (2d Cir. 2015) ("The district court held that parties cannot enter into

private settlements of FLSA claims without either the approval of the district court or the

Department of Labor. We agree that absent such approval, parties cannot settle their FLSA claims
through a private stipulated dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(ii).").
1 7 0.

Id.
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In Cheeks, the plaintiff instituted an action against his former
employer to recover overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorney's
fees under the FLSA and New York Labor Law. 17 1 The parties engaged
in discovery but ultimately agreed to a private settlement of the action
that culminated in filing a joint stipulation for voluntary dismissal
pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).1 7 2 Instead of accepting the stipulation
as filed, the district court concluded that plaintiff Cheeks could not
privately settle his FLSA claims without approval from the court or
without supervision from the DOL.1 73
On appeal, the Second Circuit asked the DOL to opine as to
whether or not actions under the FLSA are an exception to FRCP
41(a)(1)(A)(ii). 1 74 The DOL answered in the affirmative and the Second
Circuit reviewed whether or not the FLSA is an "applicable federal
statute" within the meaning of Rule 41.175 The Second Circuit also
answered in the affirmative, holding that the FLSA is an applicable
federal statute.1 7 6 The Second Circuit relied heavily on the legislative
history of the FLSA and the Supreme Court's decisions in Brooklyn
178
Savings Bank v. O'Neill7 7 and D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, which
discuss congressional intent with regard to the FLSA.1 7 9
In Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, an employee received a check
for overtime pay he was owed by his former employer; in exchange, the
plaintiff agreed to release all of his FLSA rights.

80

After signing the

release, the plaintiff brought suit under the FLSA for liquidated
damages-which were not included in the release-and the defendant

17 1. Id.
172. Id. FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) provides that a "plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court
ordering by filing ... a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared." FED. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
173. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 200. The district court sought further documentation and asked the
parties to file a copy of the settlement agreement and to show cause supporting the conclusion that
the settlement is "a reasonable compromise of disputed issues rather than a mere waiver of statutory

rights brought about by an employer's overreaching." Id.
174. Id. at 201.
175. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a)(1)(A)). The FLSA is silent as to whether Rule 41
applies to it or not, and at the time, neither the Supreme Court nor any other circuit court had
addressed the issue before the Second Circuit. Id. at 201-02. However, at least one district court in
the Second Circuit has determined that the FLSA's silence as to Rule 41 is evidence that suggests

the statute is not applicable. See Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 375
(E.D.N.Y. 2013).
176. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206.
177.

Id. at 202-06 (discussing several Supreme Court and circuit court cases); see Brooklyn

Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
178. 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
179. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 202.
180. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 324 U.S. at700.
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moved to dismiss based on the release.1 8 1 On appeal, the Supreme Court
found in favor of the plaintiff and did not enforce the release of his
claims, finding that the legislative history of the FLSA "shows an intent
on the part of Congress to protect certain groups of the population from
sub-standard wages and excessive hours which endangered the national
health and well-being and the free flow of goods in interstate
commerce." 182 It was this analysis that led many other courts to justify
court supervision of FLSA wage theft claims. 18 3
Importantly, the facts of Brooklyn Savings indicate that there was
no bona fide dispute because the liquidated damages owed to the
plaintiff were a matter of calculation and not a matter of determining the
actual amount in dispute. 18 4 This left open the question of whether FLSA
claims could be settled privately if there was a bona fide dispute." D.A.
Schulte provided a partial answer when the Court determined that bona
fide disputes as to an employee's status under the FLSA could not be
privately settled. 18 6Still, the Court left open the enforceability of private
settlements of FLSA claims "where there is a bona fide dispute as to
liability." 1 7Almost four decades later, the Eleventh Circuit decided
Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. UnitedStates1 8 8 and stated that "FLSA rights
cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would
'nullify the purposes' of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it
was designed to effectuate." 8 9
C.

Epic Violation ofPublic Policy

Without class and collective actions, employees will not be
afforded the FLSA protection originally intended by Congress.1 90 This
Subpart first discusses the prominent effects of Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis, namely that employees simply opt-out of pursuing their claims
when subject to mandatory employment arbitration,191 and next argues
181. Id.
182. Id. at 706.
183. See Keith William Diener, Judicial Approval of FLSA Back Wages Settlement
Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25, 28-29 (2017).
184. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 324 U.S. at 703.
185. See id.
186. D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114 (1946). "[N]either wages nor the damages
for withholding them are capable of reduction by compromise of controversies over coverage." Id.

at 116.
187.
188.
189.
(1981)).

Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 2015).
679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1352 (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 101 S. Ct. 1437,1444

190.

See supra Part If.B.

191.

See infra Part IV.C.1.
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that the procedures of mandatory employment arbitration contracts
violate public

policy.1 9 2 Finally, this Subpart argues that private

enforcement of wage theft claims is more effective than waiting for
public enforcement by the DOL. 93
1. Employees Subject to Arbitration Opt Not to File Their Claims
Mandatory employment arbitration clauses deter employees from
bringing claims because they cannot find attorneys to take their cases;
"[attorneys] presumably know that they are less likely to win anything
[in arbitration], and thus recover any attorneys' fees, and even less likely
to win enough to make the odyssey worthwhile for the attorney or the
client." 1 9 4 This reality is particularly gloomy when examined in the
context of today's working conditions: American workers have added
sixty-six hours to their annual total of hours, and the median income for
1 95
Yet, the
the bottom tenth of Americans has fallen twelve percent.
statutory scheme intended to protect employees-the FLSA-has
scarcely changed since it was passed as part of President Roosevelt's
96
New Deal agenda in the twentieth century.1
Professor Alexander J.S. Colvin conducted a study aimed at
determining the percentage of workers subject to mandatory arbitration;
he concluded that mandatory workplace arbitration has increased since
the 1991 Gilmer decision.1 97 In 1992, just one year after Gilmer, only
about two percent of the workforce was subject to mandatory
arbitration.'" According to a report issued in September 2017 by the
Economic Policy Institute, more than half the workers in the United
to
subject
now
are
percent)
fifty-five
(over
States
1 99
mandatoryarbitration.
The American Arbitration Association ("AAA") oversees about
half of all employment arbitrations agreements in this country, and the
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service ("JAMS") oversees an

192.
193.

See infra Part IV.C.2.
See infra Part IV.C.3.

194.

Estlund, supra note 62, at 702.

195. Ruan, supra note 25, at 357, 360.
196. Id. at 357. Ruan explains that "the FLSA's wage protections have only been significantly
amended once (in the 1940s)." Id. at 358.
197. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use ofMandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL'Y INST.
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration.
2017),
27,
(Sept.
Professor Colvin is the current dean of the Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, where he focuses his research on employment dispute resolution. AlexanderJ.S. Colvin,
CORNELL ILR SCH., https://www.ilr.cornell.edulpeople/alexander-colvin (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).

198. Colvin, supra note 197.
199. Id.
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additional twenty percent. 2 0 0 There is relatively little data concerning the
number of arbitrations that occur because many arbitration agreements
include confidentiality agreements.201 Given this lack of data, Professor
Cynthia Estlund sought to determine the number of employment claims
that are arbitrated each year and compared it to the number of
employment complaints that are litigated each year.202 Estlund
concluded that, based on the rate of employment litigation, there are
between 9600 and 28,400 "missing" arbitration claims-meaning that
many employees opt not to file employment arbitration claims.2 0 3
Even wage theft claims that are not subject to mandatory arbitration
may be missing from litigation because such claims are typically
"negative value" claims that are not economically viable to pursue
"unless brought in the aggregate" as a collective or class action.2 0 4
Generally speaking, wage theft recoveries "are often valued at less than
the transactional cost of litigation."2 0 5
Even when collective actions are filed, the procedural requirements
to join a collective action may hinder participation.2 0 6 Although section
216(b) of the FLSA is beneficial in that it allows plaintiffs to aggregate
their claims through a collective action, the 216(b) collective action
device requires potential wage theft victims to affirmatively opt-in to the
suit; other types of civil cases operate on an opt-out basis, requiring
nothing of class members for them to be included.2 0 7 Low wage earners
may be unaware of their rights or be misinformed by an employer with
regard to these rights, making it more difficult to opt-in to a 216(b)
collective action.20 8
200.

Estlund, supra note 62, at 684-85. Professor Estlund is a law professor at New York

University and a leading scholar on labor and employment law. Cynthia Estlund, NYU LAW,
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfn?fuseaction=profile.biography&personid=25449
(last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
201. Estlund, supra note 62, at 680. Asa result of this secrecy, employers do not have to worry
about their public image with regard to their "illegal or legally questionable conduct." Id. at 681.
202. See id. at 681-83, 689-700.
203. Id. at 691-92.
204. Ruan, supra note 25, at 374 ("Most wage claims involve relatively small per-person
damages, and even though these lost wages are vital to low-wage workers, they are not profitable

for plaintiffs attorneys.").
205. Id.
206. Id. at 374-75.
207. Id. The FLSA's 216(b) opt-in procedure differs from other federal claims, like consumer
fraud and antitrust claims, that can be pursued on an opt-out basis under FRCP 23. Id. at 374-75.
Under Rule 23, all individuals who are part of a certified class are automatically deemed class
members and do not have to take any affirmative action, unless they do not want to be part of the
class action; in that case, they can opt-out. Id. at 374-75.

208.

Id. at 375. The well-being of employees who do opt-in to a collective action may be

affected and they may experience stress "about being named in litigation against their employer for
years on end." Tippett, supra note 18, at 386.
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2. Class Waivers Are Not Truly Voluntary
When an employee signs an employment agreement, it is likely that
they have no clue that a mandatory employment arbitration clause with a
209
Even if an employee does spot
class waiver is part of the agreement.
it is unlikely that they will
agreement,
employment
an
in
such a clause
2 10
Professor Todd D. Rakoff notes
understand what they are agreeing to.
that drafters of contracts of adhesion expect that the contract is not likely
to be read by the adhering party before signing, and even if the adhering
party has read the terms, the drafter expects that it is unlikely the reader
understood them. 2 1 1 Some United States senators recognized this reality
when the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 was introduced:
Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option
whether to submit their claims to arbitration. Few people realize, or
understand the importance of the deliberately fine print that strips them
of rights; and because entire industries are adopting these clauses,
people increasingly have no choice but to accept them. They must
often give up their rights as a condition of having a job.... Often
212
times, they are not even aware that they have given up their rights.
Another troubling fact with respect to mandatory arbitration is that
some employees will have their rights to proceed as a class waived
2 13
In Epic, for example,
without ever signing such an agreement.
were emailed
employees
as
working
already
were
who
individuals
with the
employment
arbitration agreements, and their continued
companies was deemed acceptance to the terms, which included
2 14
This method of
individual arbitration of any wage and hour claims.
of United
number
a
by
acceptable
deemed
been
has
obtaining consent
215
concern.
for
cause
States circuit courts, but it is nonetheless a

209.

See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.

REv. 1173, 1179-80 n.23 (1983).
210. Id. at 1180 n.23 (pointing out that "[e]mployees regularly using a form often have only a
limited understanding of its terms and limited authority to vary them"). This fact applies in the
consumer context as well. Id. at 1179-80 n.23. Further, "[c]ustomers do not in fact ordinarily
understand or even read the standard terms [in consumer contracts]."Id. at 1180 n.23.

211. Id. at 1179 n.23. Professor Rakoffis a lawprofessorat Harvard Law School. Id. at 1173.
212. Arbitration Fairness Act of2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 2(3) (2007). The bill was never
passed. See S. 1782 - Arbitration FairnessAct of2007, GovTRACK, https://www.congress.gov/bill/

S10th-congress/senate-bill/1782 (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (stating that the last action taken on the
bill was a Senate hearing).
213. See S. 1782 § 2(3) (noting that consumers and employees lose rights as a condition of
continued employment).

214.

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1636 n.2 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

215.

See Lauren A. Daming & Heather M. Mehta, An Epic Article: The Fate ofAgreements to

Individually Arbitrate Claims Arising Under ERISA After Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 34 J. COMP.
& BENEFITS, Sept./Oct. 2018, at 1, 8 ("Although Justice Ginsburg clearly was troubled by this
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Further, the FLSA was intended to protect those employees who are
the most vulnerable and who have the lowest pay.2 1 6 The Supreme Court
has even gone so far as to state that the FLSA "was a recognition of the
fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and
employee, certain segments of the population required federal
compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which
endangered national health and efficiency." 2 1 7 These facts, when taken
together, make it clear that employees need protection from their
employers, and that agreement to individual arbitration by employees is
not truly voluntary as a matter of publicpolicy. 2 18
3. Private Enforcement of Wage and Hour Claims Is More
Effective Than Public Enforcement by the DOL
The ability to pursue wage theft claims in court (as opposed to via
arbitration) is imperative because wage theft victims recover more
money through private enforcement than they do through public
enforcement. 2 19Private enforcement is critical to obtaining recoveries
for wage theft victims because public enforcement through the DOL is
not as aggressive. 2 2 0 For example, the DOL does not always go after
non-compliant employers for the full amount of damages, and when
negotiating with employers, investigators in the Wage and Hour
Division of the DOL do not seek recovery of liquidated damages (which
the FLSA provides for) 22 1 and full backpay. 222 Private attorneys may be
more likely to pursue damages to the fullest extent because they
typically take wage and hour class and collective action cases on a
contingency fee basis, meaning that they earn a percentage of the

manner of acceptance, the practice is consistent with state contract law, as many circuit courts have

held.").
216. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945).
217. Id. at 706-07.
218. See supra Parts m.A-B, I.C.2.
219. Meixell & Eisenbrey, supra note 15. It seems that the DOL and other public agencies
recover less money for wage theft victims. Id. For example, Meixell and Eisenbrey found that in
2012, $467 million out of a total $933 million was recovered by private attorneys. Id This amount

is a slim majority of money recovered, but a significant figure nonetheless. Id. The $467 million
recovered by private attorneys is more than the total of the amount recovered by the U.S. DOL
($280 million), by state departments of labor ($172 million), and by state attorneys general ($14

million). Id.
220. See Ruan, supra note 135, at 1111-12 (discussing a lack of resources, a decrease in the
number of employees served by the DOL, and a decline in the number of cases resolved by the

DOL).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
222. Ruan, supra note 135, at 1113. In 2008, the DOL recovered approximately $185 million
in backpay for 228,645 employees. Id. at 1112.
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settlement, and higher settlements mean larger paydays.2 2 3 In contrast,
the DOL has limited resources and staffing, and there are documented
instances of the agency mishandling wage claims.2 2 4
IV.

SAFEGUARDING WAGE AND HouR CLAIMS
BY AMENDING THE FAA

This Part advocates for action to rectify the wage theft epidemic
stemming from the Supreme Court's line of decisions favoring
arbitration.2 25 Other efforts to rectify the problems have been
undertaken, but further efforts are necessary.2 2 6 For one thing, legislative
bills introduced to outright ban mandatory arbitration are unlikely to
227
come into fruition.
First, Subpart A discusses solutions posited by
others.2 2 8Next, Subpart B proposes a new solution-one that aims to
more adequately alert employees to the fact that they are signing
arbitration agreements, and one that invalidates agreements that are not
accompanied by adequate information for employees.2 2 9
A.

Other Efforts to CorrectArbitrationInjustice

For at least a decade, members of both the United States House of
Representatives and the Senate have repeatedly introduced versions of
legislation called the Arbitration Fairness Act ("AFA"), intended to
amend the FAA to bar mandatory arbitration in the employment
context. 2 3 0One of the most recent pieces of such legislation, the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2018 ("2018 AFA"), was introduced to
Congress in March 2018 by Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut

223. See When You Needa Lawyer, A.B.A. (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/gro
ups/public education/resources/law issues for consumers/lawyerfees contingent.
224. Ruan, supra note 25, at 364-65. The Governmental Accountability Office investigated the
DOL's Wage and Hour Division with undercover agents who posed as employees in need of legal
services; the DOL mishandled nine out of ten cases. Id. at 365-66.
225. See infra Part IV.B.
226. See infra Part W.A.
227. See infra Part W.A.
228. See infra Part W.A.
229. See infra Part W.B.
230. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, S. 537, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133,
114th Cong. § 3 (2015); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013);
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
Note that the various Arbitration Fairness Acts introduced over the years have sought to eliminate
mandatory arbitration not only in the employment context, but also in the consumer, antitrust, and
civil rights contexts. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2018, S. 2591, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018).
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and more than two dozen other co-sponsors. 231 The 2018 AFA
acknowledges the inequity in bargaining power in the employment
context, as well as the reality that many employees are unaware that they
have signed away certain rights to adjudicate their claims.2 3 2 To remedy
these problems, the 2018 AFA proposes that "no predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an
employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights
dispute." 2 3 3However, many versions of the AFA have died in Congress
without passage. 2 3 4 Like these previous legislative attempts to ban
mandatory employment arbitration, the 2018 AFA died when the 115th
session of Congress concluded on January 3, 2019 without passing the
bill. 2 3 5The 2018 AFA was scarcely considered, having only been read
twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.2 3 6
The desire to eliminate mandatory employment arbitration is a
largely partisan issue, demonstrated by the fact that Democrats in
Congress overwhelmingly introduce and sponsor arbitration fairness
legislation, while their Republican counterparts do not.2 3 7 For example,
the 2018 AFA had thirty-two co-sponsors, of whom thirty-one were
Democrats and one was Independent. 2 3 8Further, it is safe to surmise that
the path to the Epic decision was drastically impacted by the 2016
presidential election of Republican candidate Donald J. Trump. 2 3 9
231. S.2591.
232. Id. § 2(3).
233. Id. § 3.
234. See, e.g., H.R. 3010 (110th): Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr3OlO (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (stating the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 "[d]ied in a previous Congress"); S. 987 (112'h): Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2011, GovTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s987

(last visited

Jan. 25, 2020) (stating the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 "[d]ied in a previous Congress").
235.

S. 2591 (115th): Arbitration FairnessAct of2018, GovTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/c

ongress/bills/115/s2591 (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (stating that the bill was introduced during the
115th Congress, "which met from Jan 3, 2017 to Jan 3, 2019" and explaining that "[]egislation not
enacted by the end of a Congress is cleared from the books").
236. See S. 2591: Arbitration FairnessAct of2018, PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.or

g/represent/bills/115/s2591 (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
237.

See, e.g., Alexia Fernandez Campbell, House Democrats Have a Sweeping Plan to

Protect Millions

of

Workers'

Legal

Rights,

Vox

(Nov.

14,

2018,

1:40

PM),

https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/14/18087490/mandatory-arbitration-house-demo
crats (reporting that Democrats in the House of Representatives introduced the Restoring Justice for
Workers Act to ban businesses from forcing workers to arbitrate their claims; the bill has fifty-seven
co-sponsors-all of them being Democrats). It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court is fairly
partisan on the issue of mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., Liptak supra note 118, at B3 (calling one of
the Court's 5-4 decisions a "split along ideological lines").

238. S. 2591 (115th): Arbitration FairnessAct of2018, supra note 235.
239. See Roger Parloff, Supreme Court Case Threatens to Set Back Workers' Rights by 80
Years, YAHOO! (Sept. 28, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/supreme-court-case-threatens-set-

back-workers-rights-80-years-131503728.html.
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Before the election, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ")
filed a petition in September 2016 favoring a "pro-employee stance that
the National Labor Relations Board had taken on [class waivers in
arbitration]."2 40 Following President Trump's election, the DOJ
"switched sides" to support the employers' position, favoring the
enforcement of class and collective action waivers in arbitration
agreements. 2 4 1Moreover, after being elected, President Trump received
the opportunity to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court when Justice
Scalia passed away in February 2016.242 President Trump nominated
Neil Gorsuch to the late Justice Scalia's seat on the Supreme Court, and
Justice Gorsuch was ultimately responsible for authoring the majority
opinion for Epic in 2018.243 Differing ideologies make it difficult to
entirely eliminate mandatory arbitration in the employment context.2 4
Private organizations have also made efforts to curb the inequity in
arbitration that employees face. 2 4 5 The Due Process Protocol and the
Dunlop Protocol were drafted to ensure procedural fairness in
arbitration, and the leading arbitration organizations, AAA and JAMS,
will refuse to arbitrate a case they deem procedurally unfair.2 4 6 These
procedural safeguards are intended to provide employees subject to
arbitration with at least a baseline of discovery and fair selection of an
arbitrator. 2 4 7According to its website, AAA now also caps an individual
employee's arbitration fees at $300, unless the arbitration agreement
provides that the employee pay less.2 4 8

240. Id.
241. Id.
242.

(Feb.

Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Still Feeling the Impact ofAntonin Scalia's Death, CNN

13, 2018, 10:46 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/13/politics/scalia-gorsuch-supreme-

court/index.html. During his Supreme Court tenure, Justice Scalia authored a pro-arbitration
majority opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant that was widely commented

on. Mark Joseph Stem, Epic Distortion, SLATE (May 22, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2018/05/neil-gorsuchs-ruling-in-epic-systems-v-lewis-harkens-back-to-the-supremecourts-lochner-era.html. Justice Gorsuch's Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis decision has been heralded

as "a sequel to Scalia's infamous decision." Id.
243. Biskupic, supra note 242; Stem, supra note 242.
244.

See supra Part IV.A.

245. St. Antoine, supra note 61, at 421-23.
246. Id.
247. See AM. ARB. ASS'N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL 2, 3 (1995),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document repository/Employment/o20Due%2Process%20P

rotocol_0.pdf (May 9, 1995).
248. Employment Arbitration Under AAA Administration, AM. ARB. ASS'N, https://www.adr.or

g/employment (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
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Amending the FAA: Cashing in ProtectionsforEmployees

Although arbitration organizations such as AAA have made
changes to their arbitration procedures, the voluntariness of arbitration
agreements in the employment context is still questionable; given the
deeply problematic nature of mandatory employment arbitration, more
change must come.249 Congressional partisanship with regard to
mandatory employment arbitration suggests that an all-out ban on
mandatory arbitration is not currently feasible. 2 50 But that does not mean
compromise is not to be had.2 5 1 This Note proposes that sensible
compromise can be achieved by amending the FAA to require employers
to: (1) distribute to employees a DOL fact sheet with information on
arbitration and class waivers before any arbitration clause or class
waiver is signed, and (2) have employees separately initial arbitration
and class waiver clauses.2 5 2
Distribution of a fact sheet and a requirement that class waiver
clauses be separately initialed are measures intended to ameliorate the
involuntary nature of arbitration in employment contracts.2 5 3 This Note
proposes change specifically through amendment of already existing
federal legislation-the FAA-because any state legislation that
attempts to rectify problems associated with mandatory employment
arbitration by, for example, barring class waivers in employment
contracts, is likely to be thwarted by the Supremacy Clause and the socalled federal policy favoring arbitration.2 5 4
1. Employees Must Be Supplied with Fact Sheets Ex Ante
Because Epic is the law of the land, employers have increasingly
turned to mandatory employment arbitration clauses that cannot be
undone after an employee has already contractually signed away the
255
right to seek redress in a United States court of law.
Consequently,
there is no way around arbitration ex post, or in other words, after the
contract has been signed-barring situations provided for by Sections 10

249. See supra Parts II.C.2, W.A.
250.
251.

See supra Part IV.A.
See infra Part W.B.

252. See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
253. See supra Part II.C.2.
254. See Gilles, supra note 22, at 2229 (arguing that state legislatures cannot pass legislation
that undercuts the federal policy favoring arbitration because of the Supremacy Clause in the U.S.
Constitution).
255. SeesupraPartI.
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and 11 of the FAA.2 5 6 Accordingly, at the time of signing any
employment contract containing an arbitration clause and/or class
waiver, an employee should be provided with a government-issued
fact sheet.2 57
The DOL's Wage and Hour Division already publishes dozens of
other fact sheets.2 58 For example, the DOL has a fact sheet on
recordkeeping requirements under the FLSA and on overtime pay
requirements under the FLSA. 2 59 The DOL even issues fact sheets
containing information for specific employment sectors such as day
260
Most
laborers, construction workers, and blue-collar employees.
commonly
into
translated
are
sheets
fact
helpfully, many of the DOL's
spoken languages, in addition to English. 261 This is particularly
important because many of the most vulnerable employees are day
laborers, who are often immigrants that may not speak any English or
may only have limited English language skills, and who may be
intimidated to bring claims because of their immigration status.2 6 2
The fact sheet should contain information describing arbitration and
alerting the employee that any claims arising out of employment with
the employer cannot be filed in a court of law after signing an agreement
with an arbitration clause. 2 6 3 The fact sheet should also explain class and
collective action waivers. 2 6 4 Once drafted and published, employers can
easily obtain fact sheets to provide to their employees because the DOL
265
already accepts e-mail requests for orders of printed fact sheets.
Currently, the DOL does not have a fact sheet on their website that is
tailored to provide employment arbitration information.2 6 6 Thus, this
Note proposes that the DOL draft a fact sheet including the following
information: a definition of arbitration; 267 an explanation of the
268 an
differences between arbitration and judicial procedures;
256. See 9 U.S.C.

§§

1011 (2012) (listing the exclusive grounds for vacating, rehearing,

modifying, or correcting an arbitration award).
257. See, e.g., Topical Fact Sheet Index, DEP'T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/fact-sheets-

index.htrn (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (listing a variety of DOL-issued fact sheets, including one
specifically for day laborers).
2 5 8. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id For instance, the DOL's fact sheet for the day laborer industry is translated into
Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Thai, and Vietnamese. Id.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See supra note 25.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part m.B.
Topical FactSheet Index, supra note 257.

266. Id
267. See Grenig, supra note 8, at 100-01.
268. Id
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explanation of class and collective action waivers, emphasizing that they
require an employee to bring their claims individually; 269 and details on
where to obtain additional resources and information.2 7 0
To encourage employers to comply with distribution of fact sheets,
the FAA should be amended to invalidate any arbitration clause or class
waiver that is unaccompanied by a DOL fact sheet at the time of
signing. 2 71 Thissolution has a two-fold purpose: (1) to inform employees
about the arbitration process, 2 7 2 and (2) to provide employees with the
opportunity to pursue their claims in court and/or on a class-wide basis if
an employer does not comply with the fact sheet provision.2 7 3 Because
many wage-theft claims are only viable when pursued on a collective or
class basis,27 4the imposition of this requirement would act similarly to a
condition precedent to the creation of an enforceable arbitration
agreement, and would create a loophole to mandatory arbitration,
allowing employees to pursue their claims both in court and on a
collective basis when an employer fails to distribute the fact sheet. 2 75
The most logical section to amend is Section 2 of the FAA, which
pertains to the "[v]alidity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate."2 7 6
2. Employees Must Separately Initial Arbitration and Class
Waiver Clauses
As discussed throughout this Note, many employees enter into
arbitration agreements and agree to class waivers with their employers
unknowingly. 2 7 7 Thistypically occurs when an employee signs an
employment contract. 27 8The average employee does not know what
arbitration or class waivers are and does not read such clauses when they
are tucked into a longer standard contract. 27 9 An ex ante DOL fact sheet

269.

See supra Part II.B (describing class and collective procedures).

270.

Topical Fact Sheet Index, supra note 257. Atypical DOL fact sheet also provides contact

information for the DOL and the web address for the Wage and Hour Division. Id.
271. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (typically arbitration clauses are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable" unless there are grounds "at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract").
272. SeesupraPartI.

273.
274.

See supra Part IH.B.
See supra Part II.C.I.

275. See supra Part I.C. A condition precedent can be defined as follows: "in a contract, an
event which must take place before a party to a contract must perform or do their part." Condition
Precedent, LAW.COM, https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=280 (last visited Jan. 25,

2020).
276.
277.
278.

9 U.S.C. § 2.
See supraPart
See supra Part

U.C.2.
UI.C.2.

279.

See supra Part

.C.2.
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280
can improve an employee's understanding of arbitration. Requiring an
employee to separately initial an arbitration or class waiver clause can
alert employees to actually read a particular clause. 281 Such a technique
is sometimes used in liquidated damage provisions within real estate
contracts of sale. 2 8 2 In those contracts, some states require the parties to
283
the contract to separately sign or initial the internal provision.
Formatting the arbitration and/or class waiver provisions in bold could
also further the purpose of bringing attention to the clauses and "make
2 84
the parties appreciate the consequences of initialing the provision."
Minimum font-sizes and red typeface have also been used in state laws
to bring a signing party's attention to a clause. 2 85 Although this proposal
does not aid employees who feel pressured into signing an arbitration
agreement by their employer, it does address the information problem
employees face, and can provide them with additional resources by
including the DOL's contact information.2 86

V.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis was made as a matter
disregarding the FLSA's intent-but even Justice Gorsuch left
law,
of
8 7
room to debate whether the decision was sound as a matter of policy.
This Note advocates that Congress take public policy and the legislative
intent of the FLSA into account to amend the FAA; employees have too
little bargaining power to appropriately waive their class rights before
such a claim even arises, and mandatory employment arbitration leads to
the underenforcement of wage claims. 28 8 This Note takes a pragmatic
approach, advocating not to eliminate mandatory employment arbitration
and class waivers entirely, but instead to provide employees with more
information and resources at the time of signing and create pre280. See, e.g., Rakoff supra note 209, at 1180 n.23 (noting that employees usually only have a
limited understanding of standard contracts and do not have the power to negotiate the terms).
281. See Liquidated Damages, Initial with Care!, DELEON REALTY (Nov. 27, 2014),
(discussing a California law that
https://deleonrealty.com/2014/liquidated-damages-initial-care
10-point bold type or an 8-point
a
minimum
in
printed
to
be
provisions
damages
requires liquidated
bold type in the color red in order to ensure that "the parties appreciate the consequences of

initialing the provision").
282. GREGORY M. STEIN ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS: FROMCONTRACT TO CLOSING 124 (3d ed. 2016).

283. Id.
284.

LiquidatedDamages, Initial with Care!, supra note 281.

285. Id.
286. See Rakoff, supra note 209, at 1179-80 n.23.
287. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) ("As a matter of policy these
questions are surely debatable.").
288. See supra Part III.C.
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conditions to the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements in the
289
employment context.
There are too many problems with mandatory employment
arbitration as is: Without the ability to proceed as a class, many
individual claims are simply too expensive to arbitrate (or litigate for
that matter), and individuals face considerable difficulty finding an
attorney to take on their case. 29 0 As a result, employees are barred from
seeking redress through the courts and are denied the opportunity to
adjudicate their claims. 2 9 1 Further, the policy of expanding arbitration
flies in the face of Supreme Court and circuit court precedent requiring
that FLSA settlements receive judicial approval to mitigate the
inequality in bargaining power between employee and employer. 292The
effect of ignoring important precedent regarding the FLSA's purpose
comes at the expense of employees who require the very protection the
FLSA was meant to provide.29 3
In sum, this Note aims to strike a bipartisan compromise, capable of
passage by the United States Congress because it is not so drastic as to
completely eliminate arbitration in the employment context. 2 9 4 Still,
there is great need for change to counter the imbalance in bargaining
power that exists between employee and employer: "Arbitration can be
an acceptable alternative when consent to the arbitration is truly
voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises."2 9 5
Brittany Cangelosi*

289.

See supra Part IV.B.

290.
291.
292.

See supra Part III.C.1.
See supra Part III.C.1.
See supra Part Ill.B.
See supra Part m.B.

293.
294.

See supra Part IV.A.

295. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2018, S. 2591, 115th Cong. § 2(5) (2018).
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